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Abstract—Shibboleth is an architecture and protocol for
allowing users to authenticate and be authorized to use a
remote resource by logging into the identity management
system that is maintained at their home institution. With
Shibboleth, a federation of institutions can share resources
among users and yet allow the administration of both the
user access control to resources and the user identity and
attribute information to be performed at the hosting or
home institution. Subversion is a version control repository
system that allows the creation of fine-grained permissions
to files and directories. In this project an infrastructure,
Shibbolized Subversion, has been created that consists of a
Subversion repository with an Apache web interface that is
protected by a Shibboleth authentication system. The
infrastructure can allow authorized and authenticated data
sharing between institutions yet retains simplicity and
protects privacy for users. In addition, it also relieves local
administrators from the task of having to perform extra
account management for users from other institutions. This
paper describes the Shibboleth and Subversion systems, the
implementation of the file sharing infrastructure, and issues
of attribute maintenance, privacy and security.
Index Terms—Fine-Grained Access Control,
Authentication, Authorization, Shibboleth, Subversion

I. INTRODUCTION
Educational and research activities are not confined to
a single institution, but are performed collaboratively
among cooperating institutions across the country or even
around the world. As a result, there is a need for the
development of resource sharing infrastructure between
geographically separated institutions under different
administrative domains.
For example, it is not
uncommon for a group of scientists from several
institutions to collaborate on a proposal, or for a group of
educators, also from several different institutions, to
collaborate on the development of course or training
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materials. The documents that are developed need to be
shared among the project participants in an authorized
and easy-to-use manner. The focus of this project is to
develop a system for sharing documents such as data
files, code, research papers, proposal documents, course
materials, and others, in an authorized manner within a
collaboration group of individuals from two or more
institutions.
It is relatively easy to allow several users to have
general access to a repository by providing individual
accounts to that repository. It is also relatively easy, given
that accounts have been set up, to provide fine-grained
access for individuals or groups at the directory or file
level using standard Unix or database access permissions.
However, the administration of the system, including the
maintenance of individual user accounts and permissions
for various levels of group access, becomes much more
complex and difficult if the number of users is increased
to several hundred, if these several hundred user accounts
are changing continuously, and if the user accounts are
spread across several institutions. Even the simplest case
typically requires solving a number of non-technical
difficulties. For example, suppose that a group of
researchers at University A need to access data at
University B. In general to allow this access may require
a long distance call, working across different time zones
with different work load and schedules, and navigating
different internal politics. A fine-grained access control
method that allows a certain degree of independence for
both the resource provider and resource users is needed.
The provision of a system for document sharing must
address issues such as user account management, access
control of the shared data, and ease of usage. The system
must allow a degree of simplicity for both administrators
and users, and must have an authorization system flexible
enough to allow fine-grained access control at the user
and group level.
To address these issues, a shared repository system has
been created with the following characteristics:
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• The system is a shared repository with open access for
trusted institutions.
• The test of authentication of a user’s identity is
separated from the test of authorization to access with
certain privilege any particular file or directory in the
repository.
• No additional identity provider is required for the
group of cooperating institutions or individuals.
Authentication is done by each individual’s institution
using the login name and password that is provided to
the individual by the home institution.
• Authorization is performed by matching user attributes
with resource properties.
User attributes are
administrated at the home institutions along with the
user’s local institution accounts. Resources properties
are maintained by the administrators of the target
repository resources.
• The degree of fine-grained access control can be
manipulated as needed.
• Basic requirements such as security and authenticity
are guaranteed.
• The system also allows a user to access a repository
without revealing personally identifying information, if
this capability is allowed by the resource administrator.
• The system can be run on different platforms and no
extra installation is required on the client side.
This repository system addresses communication and
administration issues between the resource provider of
the shared repository systems and the administrators in
the authenticating institutions. The constructed document
sharing system utilizes the existing identity providers
from different institutions in order to further understand
the difficulties of working in a federated community.
II. BACKGROUND
The system that has been developed is based on
Subversion, a well known open source document
repository system, and on the Shibboleth open source
system for managing federated access to shared
resources. This section gives background on version
control systems, including Subversion in particular, and
Shibboleth. The section also discusses the nature of
access control architectures.
A. Version Control Systems
Version control systems have been used historically in
the engineering and software development environments
to manage the development of source code and other
engineering documents associated with the development
process. A version control system typically allows a user
to “check out” a document for either read or write access.
If a document is checked out for write access then, at
minimum, other participating members of the group will
be alerted to the possible change and can avoid making
modifications to the document at the same time. Typical
features of a version control system include the ability to
check out documents, synchronize different changes from
different users to a document, and reverse these changes
back to an earlier version of the document.
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A number of version control systems are commonly
used, including Revision Control System (RCS) [1],
Project Revision Control System (PRCS) [2], Concurrent
Version System (CVS) [3], and Subversion [4].
Subversion is an open source version control system.
Subversion has many features similar to a traditional
version control system and overcomes some limitations
of traditional version control systems. One of the new
features of Subversion is versioned metadata, which plays
an important role in the shared repository system
developed here. Metadata is information about a file such
as file name or access permissions. With versioned
metadata, a set of properties can be assigned for each file
and directory of the repository in the form of keys and
their values. Furthermore, these properties can also be
versioned, which means that access permissions can be
tracked over time to see which groups or users have
historically had access to files and directories. Due to
this characteristic, Subversion was chosen to be the
repository in this storage system.
B. Shibboleth
Shibboleth is a project of the Middleware Architecture
Committee for Education (MACE) [5] and offers a
powerful, scalable, and easy-to-use solution for
authentication and authorization access control.
Shibboleth has been under development since 2001, is a
stable tool, and has been incorporated into National
Science Foundation's Middleware Initiative (NMI)
Release 9 [6]. The Shibboleth system is able to:
• Utilize existing campus identity and access
management infrastructures to authenticate individuals
and then send information about them to a resource site.
The resource provider can set policy and make an
authorization decision based on the information that is
provided by the campus identity and attribute
information systems.
• Support
collaborations
between
campuses,
organizations, and off-campus vendor systems.
• Authenticate and authorize based on attributes only. It
is possible to allow access without revealing a user’s
identity, which allows the user’s privacy to be protected
if this is desired.
Shibboleth consists of three main components: the
Identity Provider, the WAYF (Where Are You From)
server, and the Service Provider. Also, the system
requires the existence of a certificate authority that is
trusted among all components.
The steps of the
Shibboleth protocol are described next, followed by a
more detailed discussion of each of the components of the
Shibboleth architecture.
B.1. Shibboleth Protocol. The steps of a Shibboleth
session are illustrated in Figure 1. The steps are
numbered and labeled using the underlying HyperText
Transport Protocol (HTTP) commands (e.g., GET,
POST) and proceed as follows: First, the user contacts a
Target Resource that is protected by Shibboleth (Step 1).
In this step the user uses a browser to access a web site
that is has been enabled to use Shibboleth for
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authentication and authorization. The Target Resource is
illustrated in the box labeled “Server Provider”.
In the next series of steps, the Service Provider
component redirects the user to the WAYF server so that
the user can select a local institution with which to
authenticate (Steps 2, 3, 4, and 5). The WAYF is
configured with the names of all institutions in the virtual
organization and also the corresponding Internet address
of the Identity Provider of each institution. The user
selects his or her home institution and the underlying
software redirects the user request to the Identity Provider
of the chosen institution (Step 6). The user is prompted
to enter a login name and password for the institution
(Step 7). After authentication, the Single Sign-on Service
(SSO) at the home institution confirms the identity of the
user and returns a handle to the Service Provider that
identifies the user for the remainder of the session (Steps
8 and 9).
After the user is authenticated, a separate step is
performed to determine if the user is authorized to use the
requested resource. Using the session handle, the Service
Provider requests the required attributes of the user from
an Attribute Repository (not shown in the figure). The
Attribute Repository may be maintained at the user’s
home institution, or may be maintained by a virtual
organization for a group of resources that are shared
within the virtual organization. The request for attributes
is shown in Step 10. The release of particular attributes
can be allowed or denied based on how the user or the
administration has set attribute release policies.
Finally, the Service Provider receives the attributes
(Step 11). An Assertion Consumer service component of
the Service Provider compares the user’s attributes with
the resource requirements. If the attributes match the
requirements then the user is authorized to use the
resource (Step 12).
The identity provider and attribute repository used in
this project consist of a single server. In particular, the
server is a test LDAP server that mirrors the capabilities
of the local campus LDAP server of the University of
Arkansas. The test Identity Provider is used to avoid
implementing untested attributes into the campus main
authentication server. Trusted communication is
established to other identity providers, including the local
campus LDAP server at the University of Arkansas and
the identity provider at the University of Missouri. The
tradeoffs in using a single server for both the identity
provider and the attribute repository will become more
clear in the section on the EduPerson schema. While not
using a separate attribute repository reduces many of the
technical tasks of administration and configuration, this
strategy creates several difficulties in communicating and
agreeing about unique attribute settings between the
service provider and the identity providers.
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Figure 1: Overview of Shibboleth Architecture [5]

B.2. Server Certification. The Shibboleth protocol
depends on the existence of a trust relationship between
the various components of the Shibboleth architecture,
including each Service Provider and each Identity
Provider. In Shibboleth this trust is typically guaranteed
through the use of a common Certificate Authority (CA).
Each component acquires a certificate that is signed by
the common CA The Bossie Certificate Authority created
by the University of Wisconsin is used in this project [7].
The Bossie CA provides a very minimal level of trust,
but this level of trust is sufficient for the prototype testing
for the components in this project. A Bossie certificate
was installed at the Identity Provider at the University of
Missouri. However, the Identity Provider at the
University of Arkansas, which is based on the local
campus LDAP server, uses commercial Verisign
certificates. With only these installed certificates the
Arkansas Identity Provider did not trust the Missouri
Service Provider and queries from it failed.
This
problem was resolved for the prototype testing by
manually adding the Bossie server certificate of the
Missouri Service Provider into the key store of the local
campus LDAP server.
B.3. Shibboleth Service Provider. The Subversion
Repository is configured as a Shibboleth Service
Provider. When a user contacts the repository, the request
is forwarded to the Identity Provider for authentication
purposes. After being authenticated, the Service Provider
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processes the attributes returned by the Identity Provider
for authorization/access control. A Service Provider
contains three components: Target Resource, Assertion
Consumer Service, and Attribute Requester.
Target Resource: The Target resource is the resource
that is protected by Shibboleth. As of the current release,
Shibboleth only supports web-based applications. That is,
the resource has to be accessible through an Internet
browser. However, a bridge connection can be created to
map between a web browser and a command line based
resource.
Assertion Consumer Service: The Assertion Consumer
Service is the counterpart of the Single-Sign On (SSO)
Service on the Identity Provider side, except that it is
located on the Service Provider side. This service
processes the authentication assertion from the Identity
Provider’s SSO Service. After the authentication between
the two sites has been established, it continues with
issuing the optional attribute request and then proceeds to
authenticate and authorize the users based on the result of
this attribute request.
Attribute Requester: The Attribute requester is a SAML
based attribute request mechanism that queries the
Identity Provider for the attributes needed in order for the
user to be authorized and authenticated. Once mutual
authentication has been established between the Service
Provider and the Identity Provider, this communication
can be done with a back-channel attribute exchange. This
request is optional depending on the security level of the
target resource.
The installations of the Shibboleth Service Provider
and its prerequisites are straightforward. However,
configuration between the Service Provider and the
Identity Provider is complicated and may require several
emails
and
telephone
conversations
between
implementers and administrators among the participating
sites. The advantage of Shibboleth is that once the
installation is complete and the attributes have been
agreed upon, then continued user maintenance and
resource configuration can be done independently by
local administrators.
B.4. WAYF (Where Are You From). A WAYF server is a
server listing the Identity Providers that the Service
Provider trusts. After contacting the Service Provider, the
user’s request is forwarded to a WAYF server. Here, the
user must choose an associated Identity Provider. After
selecting an Identity Provider, the request is forwarded
again to the chosen Identity Provider in order to perform
authentication. Two WAYFs are used in this project,
including a local WAYF created previously for the
WebMPI project [8], and a federated WAYF created by
the Shibboleth MACE for the InQueue Federation, a
public federation for testing purpose [9].
B.5. Shibboleth Identity Provider. The Identity Provider
is the located at the user’s local institution. Without
revealing to the Service Provider the identity of a user,
the Identity Provider will guarantee to the Service
Provider that the user is legitimate. Upon request, the
Identity Provider forwards a list of user attributes to the
Service Provider. These attributes have been previously
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approved by the users for authorization purposes only.
The Service Provider determines, based on these
attributes, whether the user is authorized to access
selected data in the repository. The Identity Provider of
Shibboleth consists of four components: the
Authentication Authority, the Attribute Authority, the
Single-Sign-On (SSO) Service, and the Artifact
Resolution Service.
Authentication Authority: The authentication authority
is used to issue authentication statements for the parties
participating in the communication process. This
component is integrated with the local authentication
system and depends on the setup of the local system.
Attribute Authority: The attribute authority processes
attribute requests [5]. That is, it receives attribute requests
from the Service Provider and processes these requests
based on the release permissions given by users. All the
requests are in the form of Security Assertion Markup
Language (SAML) messages and utilize Secure Socket
Layer (SSL)/Transport Layer Security (TLS) or SAML
message signatures for mutual authentication [5].
Single-Sign-On (SSO) Service: The SSO Service is the
location to which users are directed by the Service
Provider. This module performs authentication between
the users and their local institutions. After this process,
users are directed through a transfer service back to the
Service Provider or to an error page depending on the
authentication. This service is not a SAML service but an
HTTP resource [5].
Artifact Resolution Service: Artifact Resolution
Service is a SAML protocol [5] that binds the end-point
controlled by the Identity Provider in order to resolve a
SAML authentication assertion into corresponding
assertions from the requests of the Service Provider.
In this project, the Identity Providers are hosted by the
member institutions of the Great Plain Network (GPN)
[10].
C. Fine-grained access control
C.1. Access control methods. An access control system
consists of an access control policy and an access control
mechanism. Normally, these two components both
belong to the central administration under the form of an
access control list for policy and a mechanism to match
users with this list. However, this practice also carries
several serious shortcomings:
• Scalability is an issue when the number of users
increases.
• There is extra administrative burden in maintaining
attributes for users from other institutions.
• Adding and removing users can be slow due to the
communication delay between institutions, which can
lead to reduced productivity as well as security leaks.
• Privacy of users can be compromised when attributes
are released to Resource Providers.
Shibbolized Subversion is based on Attribute Based
Access Control (ABAC) [11]. Shibboleth allows the
exchange of attributes between its identity provider and
target provider, and these attributes are from the user’s
account on the identity provider side. In this method, the
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Subversion directories are marked with specific
properties. Only users whose attributes match with these
properties can access the directories. While still
maintaining the same level of security as traditional
access control methods, this method divides the burden of
controlling authorization evenly between user side and
repository side. Also, this method gives administrators on
the repository side the ability to approve or deny specific
access by users or by specific types of users to their own
resources. Since Subversion allows the creators of the
data in the repository to actively modify the properties of
these data, access to these data can be controlled by the
creators down to the file or directory level. Hence,
besides providing fine grain access control, ABAC also
encourages an equal participation of both sides, the
Resource Provider and the Identity Provider in the access
control process.
C.2. EduPerson. For resources that are being shared to a
large community, it is also to the benefit of the resource
provider to have a set of common attributes that can be
easily categorized and distinguished. Among the
Shibboleth participants, the most popular attribute
scheme is EduPerson, which is the default scheme in
Shibboleth’s AAP.xml file. It defines a series of fields
that are most relevant to the academic environment, and
these fields are object class definitions for LDAP servers.
Several fields in the EduPerson schema are used for
authorization purposes in this project:
eduPersonPrimaryAffiliation: This field provides the
name of the identity provider that the user is associated
with.
eduPersonScopedAffiliation: This field identifies the
role of the user within the identity provider. Such role can
be staff, student, or administrators, etc.
eduPersonEntitlement: This field contains the accesscontrol attributes. As described in EduPerson
specification, this field accepts attributes with multiple
values. Consequently, attributes to describe different
levels of access control can be applied.
eduPersonTargetedId: This field contains a unique ID
that represents the user, instead of the normal login name.
This is to satisfy the requirement of protecting the
identity of the user, yet provide means for the service
provider to backtrack and report to the identity provider
in the case of malicious usage. Usually, this ID can be an
encrypted combination of several attributes of the user.
The fields discussed above are the ones recommended
by the InQueue [12] and InCommon [13] federations.
Depending on the institutions, more fields can be added
to further describe the personal attributes of the users.
However, the more information is required from the
users, the better the security and privacy policy has to be
in order to prevent legal complications.

III. DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION
Shibbolized Subversion has been implemented with
three main separate modules: the browser interface, the
connection scripts, and the repository. These modules are
© 2007 ACADEMY PUBLISHER

loosely connected by function calls among themselves,
and the infrastructure can change without affecting the
whole system as long as the interfaces are kept the same.
Figure 2 illustrates the overall structure of the
Shibbolized Subversion system.
A. Browser Interface and Security
The browser interface for Shibbolized Subversion is
created using Perl CGI and HTML. The main purpose of
this module is to provide a simple and easy-to-use
interface for users while still retaining most of the
important commands of Subversion. There are currently
five basic Subversion commands implemented in this
interface: check out, add, update, status, and commit.

IdP
Origin

User
Authentication

Browser

Attribute
Assertion

SP
(Shibbolized Interface)

Script
Local System

Repository

Figure 2: Shibbolized Repository System

A.1. Browser interface structure. The websites of the
Shibbolized Subversion user interface are designed using
Perl CGI. However, most of the HTML code is embedded
in the local scripts called by the CGI programs so that the
system can display HTML as well as perform local
functions seamlessly. Although these CGI programs carry
the initial HTML web page, most of the internal displays
of the pages are controlled by the local scripts.
Furthermore, the CGI programs have the responsibility of
maintaining many default inputs for the local scripts such
as name and path of the repository and access control
attributes.
A.2. External security. The browser interface performs
the function of providing external security of the system.
External security provides the access control and
authentication for the repository. The primary
responsibilities of external security are:
• Authenticate the users with their Identity Provider,
• Provide the users with secured connection for the
exchange of password and attributes, and
• Pass the users’ attributes to internal security for access
control decisions.
These responsibilities are implemented using
Shibboleth as an Apache security module for the website.
The Shibboleth structure provides identification,
authentication, authorization, and accountability [14].

.
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With Shibboleth, identification and authentication are
guaranteed by the Identity Provider to make sure that the
users are indeed members of the campus organizations
and that they are who they say that they are as provided
by the users’ password. Furthermore, attributes of the
users that are passed by the Identity Provider to the
Service Provider allow access control decisions to be
made. Finally, since these attributes are permitted to be
impersonal, the privacy of the users may be protected if
that information is not required by the resource.
B. Local Scripts and Internal Access Control
The version of Shibboleth’s attribute assertion system
used in this project only functions with Web applications
[15]. Subversion repository content can be displayed on
web pages using Apache’s WebDAV. However, only
read access can be performed on the web-based
Subversion repository. Subversion can only achieve its
fullest potential when being accessed with the command
line interface. As a result, a mechanism to connect the
functionalities of Shibboleth and Subversion is needed. In
order to solve this problem, a series of local shell scripts
have been used to perform the following functions:
• Receive the attributes passed from Shibboleth
• Perform Subversion commands based on the policies
dictated by these attributes
• Display the results of the Subversion commands to a
web page
B.1. Attribute passing. The attributes are acquired from
the Identity Provider and passed to HTML in the form of
HTML
headers.
For
example,
the
attribute
eduPersonScopedAffiliation can be accessed by the
header of HTTP_SHIB_EP_AFFILIATION. For the
prototype system, there are three eduPerson attributes that
are
requested
from
the
Identity
Provider:
ScopedAffiliation, Entitlement, and TargetedID. While
ScopedAffiliation and TargetedID are used to help create
a unique workspace for the user, Entitlement contains all
the information concerning the authorization level of the
user. After being authenticated, a workspace is created
for the user by creating a directory whose name is the
concatenation of the values returned for ScopedAffiliation
and Entitlement. From then on, every command and data
access related to the user is performed within this
directory only. This information is written into a
temporary policy file for later use by the local scripts. A
system call from the CGI program passes the values of
ScopedAffiliation and Entitlement, and the directory to be
checked, out to the scripts.
B.2. Performance of Subversion commands. In processing
a Subversion command from the users, the local scripts
go through three steps: 1) check out the directory, 2)
match user attributes with directory’s properties, and 3)
process the Subversion command.
All of these Subversion commands require an existing
checked out version of the data. Therefore, a “svn
checkout” call is needed initially. Immediately after this
call, although the data files and directories are now
available, the user has no knowledge of the data. One of
the limitations of this method is that, if the users do not
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specify a single directory, the check out script will check
out a complete repository database. This will affect the
speed of the attributes matching process and take up a
larger than normal amount of disk space. The first
disadvantage of this method can be reduced by having a
large server disk (the checking out process is done
completely on the server side). The second disadvantage
can be limited by allowing the user to delete the extra
data after the copy of the needed document to the local
machines is finished. After the data is checked out
initially, the authorization process with attribute matching
is started.
B.3. Attribute matching. In Shibbolized Subversion, the
attribute matching process is divided into two steps:
match-attribute and authorize-attribute. Also, in order to
simplify the matching process, the following assumptions
are made:
• If a user has read access to a folder, he automatically
has read access to all the recursive folders and files
within that main folder.
• If a user has write access to a folder, it does not mean
that he has read access to that folder. In short, read and
write access capabilities are two different attributes with
equal importance and are granted independently from
each other.
• Read access is checked on files and folders, while
write access is only checked on folders.
Using a system of hooks implemented within
Subversion, a repository’s files and folders can each be
attached with multiple attributes. During the matching
process, these attributes will be recorded in a temporary
policy control file to determine read/write access.
When a user’s attributes are passed to the script, they
are first compared against the attributes attached to the
checked out directory. If a match is found, the appropriate
HTML code is generated to grant the user access right to
the directory. After the attribute matching is completed,
the scripts process the appropriate Subversion command
based on the choice of the user.
B.4. Display of results. The commands and parameters
for Subversion are embedded in the information that the
browser transfers to the local scripts. At this step, the
local scripts call the Subversion command and return the
result to the browser. Here, HTML tags are embedded
within the script itself in order to display the contents of
the result on a browser.
C. Repository
The repository is designed as a local repository using
the Subversion repository system. This is also where the
local properties are set up. Depending on the level of
security, the owner of the repository can assign properties
along different directory tree levels down to the lowest
level, the file level. The checked out files are placed in a
directory whose name is created as combination of the
user's eduPersonTargetedID and eduPersonAffiliation.
This allows a unique storage space for each individual
user in the system.
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IV. DISCUSSION
The Shibbolized Subversion system satisfies the goals
set out for the project. The use of Shibboleth as the
authentication service provides:
• Shared repository with access open for trusted
institutions. The repository has been shared with the
University of Missouri and the local campus directory.
• Authentication done by each individual’s institution
and no extra login name or password needed.
In addition, using the combination of Shibboleth
attributes transfer and Subversion’s repository
properties, we also satisfy:
• Authorization is done by a series of attributes and
matching properties set on the users’ local institution
accounts and directories in target repositories,
respectively
• The degree of fine-grained access control can be
manipulated as needed.
• Basic requirements such as security, authenticity, and
privacy are guaranteed.
Also, the system can be run on different operating
systems with web browsers, and no extra installation is
required on the client side.
A. Security
The security of a Shibbolized system depends heavily
on the level of the trust relationship between the Identity
Provider and the Service Provider. This trust is
guaranteed by the SAML protocols and the certificates
assigned to the participants by a common trusted CA. If
the participants are using different CAs, then all the CAs
have to be trusted by all parties. In this setting the
compromise of a single CA will lead to the compromise
of the whole system.
In production federation, the maintenance of a CA is
very strict. For example, the InCommon Federation has a
legal contract that requires participant to maintain certain
security practices such as separation of the machine
containing the CA from the public network and single
authority. As a result, the process of getting a certificate
can be long and troublesome.
For testing and experimenting purposes, the Bossie
certificate allows participants to quickly acquire the
certificates. However, since the keypass to acquire a
Bossie certificate is publicly broadcast online, it is not a
secure method to protect the IdP and Service Provider
servers. A production implementation of Shibbolized
Subversion would have to address this problem by
requiring that a CA with a high level of security be used
by all participants in the federation.
B. Privacy
Release of personal attributes is no simple matter. It
touches complicated issues related to personal privacy,
and it also raises many who-what-when-why-how
questions about campus security. These issues can be
summarized as [16]:
• Concern from participating institution’s compliance
and audit offices regarding security and privacy of
identity data hosted remotely (UT)
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• Demonstrated experience dealing with system-wide
projects containing sensitive and non-sensitive
information
• Completed security questionnaire detailing security
policies and procedures in place
• Required Provider-campus staff to sign security policy
authorization of client campus (CSU).
C. Technology
The installation of the Shibboleth service provider is
straightforward. However, there are several challenges to
setting up the communication between the identity
provider and the service provider from different
institutions.
The first challenge comes from the differences in the
infrastructure between the two institutions. As described
in section B.2, even within the local campus
infrastructure, the certificates may not match.
Another challenge also arises from the lack of campus
attribute infrastructure. Some institutions just do not have
the required security infrastructure that is LDAPcompatible, and it is difficult for them to upgrade their
facilities to one.
It is difficult for institutions with incompatible
infrastructures to overcome administrative difficulties in
seeking approval for a new infrastructure. Even in
institutions with infrastructure that supports Shibboleth’s
attribute release scheme, it is a struggle to have the
infrastructure set up correctly without interfering with
existing regulations. Often, it is the story of “the chicken
and the egg,” where the institution requires the users to
really “want” to use the Shibboleth system before the
infrastructure is changed, while the users desire to see the
Shibboleth system in action first before they “want” to
use it.
V. RELATED WORK
Grid computing is fast becoming a useful technology
for large scale research collaborations. For example, the
Open Science Grid (OSG) [17] has more 50 participating
institutions from inside and outside of the United States.
In order to provide adequate access control, the Open
Science Grid package uses the Virtual Organization
Membership Service (VOMS) [18] and the Grid User
Management System (GUMS) [19] for authentication and
authorization.
VOMS is part of the European project Enabling Grid
for E-SciencE (EGEE). GUMS is developed by the
Brookhaven National Laboratory. Figure 3 describes the
working relationship between VOMS and GUMS in the
OSG software stack. In this procedure, the user first
requests a proxy certificate from the VOMS server (Step
1). After authentication, the VOMS server returns a proxy
certificate containing the encrypted information of the
user (Steps 2 and 3). Next, the user contacts the Job
Execution Site and sends the recently acquired proxy
certificate (Step 4). The GUMS server decodes this
certificate and performs the authorization step (Steps 5
and 6). If the user is authorized, a local ID associate with
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the user is returned to the Gatekeeper to start executing
the user’s job under this ID (Steps 7 and 8).
The relationship between VOMS and GUMS can be
compared and contrasted to the relationship between the
Identity Provider and the Service Provider of Shibboleth.
For example, VOMS holds user identity information. In
order to use the grid, the user authenticates to the VOMS
server by providing a userid and password that has been
previously registered with the server. However, unlike
the authentication that takes place with the Shibboleth
Identity Provider, this userid is typically unrelated to any
userid that may be maintained at the user’s home
institution and the password is kept separately on the
VOMS server. GUMS is a server that matches user
proxy information to an access control list associated
with a particular service, in a manner that is similar to the
Assertion Consumer Service component of the
Shibboleth Service Provider.. However, communication
between the Shibboleth Identity Provider and Service
Provider is in the form of Security Assertion Markup
Language (SAML) assertions [5], while the
communication from VOMS to GUMS is the exchange of
a user proxy certificate [20]. Furthermore, while
Shibboleth focuses primarily on user’s attributes, VOMS
and GUMS usually use user assigned roles for access
control [20], which may not provide the same level of
fine-grained access control that is available in the
Shibboleth architecture.

Figure 3: How VOMS and GUMS work together [21]

VI. FUTURE WORK
Although the system specified here works well in a
testing environment, there are some limitations and a
number of challenges and opportunities for improvement
and future work.
Currently, the attributes being used for matching are
placed in the field eduPersonEntitlement, as this field
allows multiple values. However, there is a limit within
the EduPerson scheme definition on the length in
characters of the eduPersonEntitlement field. It is clear
that the dependence upon a single field for attribute
storage does not scale as the number of resources and
attributes in the federation increases. In order to avoid
this problem, there are several possible approaches. If the
approach using the single identity and attribute server
using the eduPerson schema is maintained, then it is
possible to either implement new eduPerson fields instead
of putting all the attributes into eduPersonEntitlement, or
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to encode attributes in order to reduce the length yet still
maintain the versatility of the attributes. Another,
perhaps more scalable, alternative is to implement a
separate attribute repository, perhaps at the federation
level [21].
An additional limitation of the current implementation
is the location of ownership permissions of the
directories.
With the current implementation, the
administrator of the Shibboleth Service Provider is also
the owner of the repository. In a production environemnt,
the directories of a repository may be owned by different
people, and each of them would want to have a more
active control on his or her data. It is necessary to provide
an implementation in which the directory owners can set
access permissions to users and groups on their own
directories and files without any action on the part of the
Service Provider administrator. In additional to giving
control to the owners, an implementation of this type
would free the administrators from some of the mundane
tasks such as setting up properties for the directories. This
can be done by implementing the commands svn propset
of Subversion and making the commands available only
for the owner of the repository.
The current design of Shibbolized Subversion allows a
convenient and quick access to a small shared data
repository. Anytime a user wants to check out a file or set
of files, a copy of that data is created on the Subversion
server. This technique will not scale to very large data
repositories.
The problem can be alleviated by
transferring the checked out data to the user’s local site.
However, a stub of the checked out directory still needs
to remain at the repository. The stub can be used to
guarantee that the Subversion hooks are in place so that
the check in process can be done later.
Currently, this system is set up for users to personally
access data. However, it is possible in the future to
further enhance the system of trust so that we can not
only trust people but also other services. For example,
user A wants to use the WebMPI service located at
institution B to process the data located at institution C.
This model would require a more complicated trust
relationship between the institutions and would lead to
more cooperation opportunities.
The source code for this project is available at
http://archie.csce.uark.edu/gpn/ [22] [23].
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